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Introduction1
Since the beginning of the Lula administration in 2003 Brazil has increased its role on the 
international stage, assuming a position of leadership on behalf of developing countries in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) through the G20 group2 and actively seeking a permanent 
seat on the United Nations Security Council. Within South America, Brazil has played a key role 
in promoting regional integration, strengthening democracy and tackling important security 
issues. 
Aware of its rise as a regional power, the European Union raised Brazil to the ranks of its 
strategic partners to cope more effectively with global challenges and strengthen bilateral 
cooperation. The launch of this strategic partnership has been regarded as the EU’s attempt to 
revive relations with Mercosur, which are currently blocked as a result of the deadlock in the 
Doha Round. 
The primary goal of this paper is to discuss how the leading position of Brazil in South America 
could contribute to boost security cooperation with the EU. The paper begins with a brief 
overview of South America’s main security concerns. Secondly, it analyzes Brazil’s foreign 
policy towards South America, and subsequently the current status of EU-Mercosur relations. 
The conclusion will offer policy recommendations for a permanent interregional dialogue on 
common security issues, identifying the main areas which have great potential to be further 
exploited. 
 
The current security concerns in South America 
South America has always been perceived as a no-war zone and consequently as an “intriguing 
anomaly” among so many regions in the world characterized by frequent interventions, 
collapsing states and wars3. In this sense, conflicts in the region have basically remained local 
affairs with few implications for global security4. 
However, in recent years this relatively peaceful panorama in South America has changed to 
show a very unstable and conflictive scenario in security terms. In an interdependent world, 
transnational threats that are present in the region like drug trafficking, organized crime and 
guerrilla activity have raised major concerns not only among South American countries but also 
with powerful actors of the international community, namely the United States and the EU. 
The central security concerns in South America are concentrated today in the Andean region 
and in the Triple Frontier area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. Whereas the internal 
situation in Colombia and remaining border conflicts among some countries are the main 
regional security issues in the Andean region, the Triple Border area has been reported to be a 
safe haven for international terrorist groups.  
The current growing concerns about regional security in the Andean region are focused on 
Colombia. This country’s internal crisis and the regional spill-over of drug trafficking and guerrilla 
activity represent a real threat to the security of Colombia’s bordering countries. 
The presence of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is clearly the country’s 
top national security problem. The FARC was established in 1964 and it is one of the richest 
and most powerful guerrilla armies in the world. It aims to overthrow the current government of 
Colombia and replace it with a Marxist government. However FARC’s tactics changed in the 
1990s, after anti-rebel rightist paramilitary groups started to attack guerrilla camps. Under 
pressure the FARC got involved in Colombian narco-trafficking, in order to raise funds for its 
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campaign. Analysts argue that the organization has lost much of its ideological backbone as a 
result of its growing participation in the Colombian cocaine industry. 
The FARC is considered a terrorist group by the Colombian government, the United States and 
the EU. Brazil, on the other hand, does not recognize the FARC as a terrorist organization, 
arguing that such a recognition would eliminate every possibility of mediation by the Brazilian 
government in the event of future peace talks in Colombia. Under the UN anti-terrorism 
Resolution 1373, a country that declares the FARC a terrorist group, would be able to freeze 
bank accounts, prohibit financing for the group, and deny FARC members refuge in their 
countries. 
The FARC is responsible for bombings, extortion, murders and kidnappings against not only 
Colombian but also foreign citizens5. Furthermore, FARC’s drug-related guerrilla activity is 
increasingly affecting the internal security of Colombia’s neighboring countries. The porous 
borders and the existence of entire areas outside of government control in the Amazonian and 
Andean regions facilitate territorial violations by the FARC6. 
On March 1 2008, Colombian forces hunted down and killed one of FARC’s leaders during an 
operation against a guerrilla camp inside Ecuador’s territory. As a result Ecuador and 
Venezuela accused Colombia of having violated Ecuador’s sovereignty. Colombia carried out 
the operation without getting Ecuador’s permission beforehand. This incident led Ecuador to 
break off diplomatic relations with Colombia and Venezuela to expel Colombia’s ambassador 
and other diplomats. Moreover, there was strong criticism directed towards the Colombian 
government from the region7. 
The situation in the Andean region becomes even more delicate given, on the one hand, the US 
security presence in the region, and on the other hand, Hugo Chávez’s political influence 
among the Andean countries, in particular Bolivia and Ecuador. 
Since the year 2000, with the launch of the controversial “Plan Colombia”8, the United States 
have played an active role in the Andean region, particularly in Colombia, by financing counter-
narcotics programs and granting military aid to the Colombian government. The strengthening 
of the military component in the fight against drug trafficking and armed groups in Colombia has 
transformed the country into the focal security challenge for South America. 
Another emerging threat is the destabilizing influence of nationalist populist leaders throughout 
the Andean region. In the last decade there has been a left-wing resurgence in Latin America. 
For instance, after Hugo Chávez’s victory in Venezuela in 1998, it was Lula and the Workers’ 
Party in Brazil in 2002, then Néstor Kirchner in Argentina in 2003, Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay 
in 2004, Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2005, Rafael Correa in Ecuador in 2006, Daniel Ortega in 
Nicaragua in 2006, and lastly Fernando Lugo in Paraguay in 2008. 
One of the main reasons behind these developments is the failure of the economic, social and 
political reforms implemented in Latin America starting in the mid-1980s. The victory of left-wing 
parties in the region have represented the search for political changes that can effectively 
respond to Latin America’s biggest problems, such as extreme inequality and poverty. 
As a result of this political transformation in the region, two Latin American lefts resurged: one 
open-minded and internationalist, like the Lula’s administration in Brazil, and other one 
nationalist and closed-minded. The most prominent example of the latter is the “chavista model” 
along with its followers, namely Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Ecuador’s Rafael Correa.  
In this connection, a so-called “refoundational populism” has risen to power in Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Venezuela. It consists of a political project which is partly nationalist, partly left-wing. 
However, a main trait of this kind of populism is its opposition to representative democracy. In 
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this sense, instead of imposing its political plan immediately after coming to power, the populist 
leader seeks to gradually gain control of all state institutions9, by removing the former political 
elite from power. With regard to external relations, “refoundational populism” stands against 
neoliberal economic policies, free trade agreements and transnational corporations. 
Bolivia also represents a real threat to regional security in the Andean region. The current 
political situation in Bolivia, marked by the latest secessionist claims from the hydrocarbon-rich 
territories, raises security concerns in Brazil. President Evo Morales has proposed a new 
constitution, which would grant more power to the country’s indigenous majority, limit 
landholdings, increase taxes, allow a President to serve two consecutive terms and give the 
federal government more control over the country’s national resources. In December 2007, the 
new constitution was approved during a session of Bolivia’s Constitutional Assembly. Nearly all 
of the 411 articles achieved a 2/3 approval from the 164 assembly members present. There are 
255 assembly members but, most of the opposition refused to participate in the session and 
declared the new charter illegal. In fact, the Assembly’s procedural guidelines state that in order 
to approve each article, 2/3 of the total assembly must endorse it, but a resolution initiated by 
Morales’s Movement to Socialism Party (MAS) changed that rule to 2/3 of assembly members 
present – which may show the government’s desire to impose its will. 
As a result, massive demonstrations took place and Bolivia’s four lowlands states declared their 
intention to become autonomous. Opposition groups come from these rich lowlands, where 
most of the country’s natural gas reserves are concentrated and the majority of the population is 
white or mestizo. Indeed, only three of Bolivia’s nine departments support the government – La 
Paz, El Alto and Oruro – the poor highlands, where the country’s (indigenous) majority lives. It is 
expected that a recall referendum over the constitutional reform may ease the tensions. Still, the 
situation worries the Brazilian government, since an internal revolution in Bolivia could produce 
a large refugee contingent that would certainly put pressure on the long border between the two 
countries10. 
Finally, remaining border conflicts still threaten the stability in the Andean region. Among the 
most significant, is the dispute between Chile and Peru over the economic zone delimited by the 
maritime boundary. At stake is one of the richest fishing areas of the world. Chile is also 
involved in diplomatic tensions with Bolivia due to this country’s historic claim over maritime 
access for its natural gas. 
These border conflicts may seem very small problems compared to major concerns like the 
FARC in Colombia, but they should be taken seriously because they cause constant diplomatic 
crises between the countries involved and the region’s very important economic interests are at 
stake. 
Regarding the security situation among Mercosur members, a central concern is the so-called 
Triple Frontier, a tri-border area along the junction of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, which has 
a large Arab immigrant population. Due to the particular geography of this border region, it is 
very difficult to guard every inch of the territory, which facilitates and promotes organized crime 
and illicit activities connected with it, such as contraband, drug and arms trafficking, corruption 
and money laundering. 
In the 1990s the governments of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay established the “Tripartite 
Commission of the Triple Frontier” to address these illicit activities. In 2002, at their invitation, 
the United States joined what became the “3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security”. 
Also during the 1990s the area was repeatedly linked to the terrorist attacks against the Israeli 
Embassy (1992) and the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires. Since 
the attacks of September 11, 2001 the U.S. government has showed major concern about the 
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activities taking place in the Triple Border area. U.S. officials claim that over the last few years 
known Islamist terrorist groups have been operating from this region, which provides such 
groups with an attractive environment for fundraising and conducting their activities, since it is a 
strategic regional hub for illegal activities. However, there has been no corroborated information 
that Islamic extremist groups have had an operational presence in the area. 
In this context, it is important to highlight the increase in the activities of US security and 
intelligence agencies in Paraguay. Brazil notes with caution the US presence in the area. The 
former Paraguayan government was moving towards a close alignment with the United States. 
However with the victory of Fernando Lugo in the last presidential elections this tendency may 
change11. 
For Brazil, a country which has placed the success of South American integration among its top 
foreign policy priorities, this scenario imposes special political responsibilities in regional 
security. The following section will discuss Brazilian foreign policy towards South America and 
its political engagement in tackling the security challenges in the region. 
 
Brazilian foreign policy towards South America 
Mercosur integration project is a top priority in Brazilian foreign policy. The bloc was created in 
March 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay under the Treaty of Asunción. In the 
long term, Mercosur aims to become a common market; so far it has reached the stage of an 
incomplete customs union. Mercosur’s institutions are built on a strictly intergovernmental basis 
and do not dispose of any influence on the decision making process of the Market12. This lack 
of institutionalization is generally explained by the permanent Brazilian refusal to forgo its 
sovereignty in favor of de facto strong common institutions13. 
Despite its market strength and the “democratic clause” that made Mercosur a respected 
international player, the bloc’s importance in the region has been perceived differently among its 
own members and also among other South American countries. Mercosur is now in a deep 
internal crisis. The current situation can be partly explained by the nature of Mercosur. It reflects 
an integration process where the asymmetries between the member states are profound. Brazil 
represents 71% of the total Mercosur population, 70% of its GDP and 58% of the bloc’s exports 
(including Venezuela). All of Mercosur’s full members’ economies are wholly dependent on their 
access to the Brazilian market, even Argentina that faces the problem of an uncompetitive 
industrial sector14. 
Negotiations concentrate on the relationship between Mercosur’s main partners Brazil and 
Argentina. This facilitates unilateral decisions taken by these two countries, such as the 
Brazilian currency devaluation in 1999 and the periodic Argentinian violations of the TEC 
(Common External Tariff). Consequently for the smaller members Paraguay and Uruguay, the 
bloc is becoming less and less attractive, given the recurrent protectionist attitudes of their two 
powerful partners. In fact, Uruguay has been considering starting negotiations for a trade 
agreement with the USA. Nevertheless, such intentions become problematic under Mercosur 
integration rules, according to which economic relations with outside partners must be decided 
on the basis of consensus by all member states. 
Furthermore, Mercosur looks more fragmented than ever. Venezuela’s accession process15 and 
the recent Bolivian request for entry16 have transformed it into an arena of dispute between 
opposing integration strategies. The defense of the “Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas” 
(ALBA) initiated by Hugo Chávez and supported by Bolivian President Evo Morales, as an 
integrated regional anti-imperialist bloc in substitution of an “old Mercosur”, has only served to 
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increase the internal fractures in Mercosur and transform it into a highly politicized integration 
process. 
Brazil is the most powerful member in Mercosur. It is not only South America’s largest economy 
but has also recently risen to become a significant actor on the international stage. In July 2007 
when the first EU-Brazil Summit took place in Lisbon, under the Portuguese Presidency of the 
EU, the launch of the strategic partnership between Brazil and the EU was formalised. In this 
way, the EU raised Brazil to the ranks of its strategic partners to cope more effectively with 
global challenges and strengthen bilateral cooperation. 
The EU’s strategic partnerships are a central component in its external relations17, and their 
importance is stressed in the EU’s security strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”18. 
Resulting largely from an awareness of the weight carried by a group of countries, the EU has 
to date launched strategic partnerships with the United States, Canada, Japan, Russia, India, 
China, South Africa, Brazil and Mexico19. 
Each of these partnerships have in common the fact that their contents reflect the EU’s foreign 
policy goals and principles. In that sense, the respect for human rights, democratic values and 
the rule of law forms part of every strategic partnership launched by the EU. Equally, foreign 
policy strategic goals presented in the EU’s security strategy, such as the fight against 
international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, have shaped the 
EU’s relations with its strategic partners. 
Still, each relationship is formed according to EU’s specific agenda towards its strategic partner. 
In this context, while energy plays a major role in relations between the EU and Russia20, 
respect of human rights, the arms embargo and the Chinese army’s growing capabilities in 
relation to Taiwan are the key issues of the relationship between China and the EU21. Equally, 
India’s nuclear tests, India-Pakistan relations and terrorism are the central areas of the EU-India 
strategic partnership.22 In effect, each EU strategic partnership deals with the most contentious 
issues. 
Notwithstanding the divergence in views between the EU and its strategic partners, the 
instrument of the strategic partnerships has helped the EU to improve its economic profile in 
different regions of the world23. Furthermore, it has proved useful for the EU to achieve a 
shared understanding on major global issues with its partners24. 
Regarding the EU-Brazil strategic partnership it covers a wide range of sectors where closer 
cooperation between the EU and Brazil could be mutually beneficial. These include global 
challenges like tackling poverty and inequality, environmental issues and energy. On a bilateral 
level, the parties have agreed to further cooperation in areas such as economic and financial 
issues, air and maritime transport, information society, satellite navigation and social matters. 
One of the main reasons for the EU’s new approach is based on a de facto recognition of 
Brazil’s emerging economic and political role in the world. It has been argued however that 
Brazil’s new strategic partnership with the EU could contribute to heightening tensions between 
Mercosur member states. President Hugo Chávez might view such a special relationship, which 
reinforces Brazil’s position as a regional power, as a threat to his political ambitions in the 
region. Moreover, the launch of the EU-Brazil strategic partnership has caused discomfort 
among Mercosur members, who fear the establishment of political and commercial agreements 
on a bilateral basis, without their involvement. 
It can also be assumed that the establishment of the EU-Brazil strategic partnership reflects 
European concerns over the possible negative effects of nationalist populist leaders’ political 
influence on the EU’s relations with South America. The rise of radical populism, particularly in 
Venezuela and Bolivia, has increased the divide between the South America and the EU. Its 
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impact on the relations between the two regions has both economic and political dimensions. In 
relation to the negotiation of commercial agreements the effects can be illustrated for example, 
by President Evo Morales’s announcement that Bolivia will not accept the conclusion of a free 
trade agreement between the CAN and the EU. Moreover, the accession of Venezuela to 
Mercosur might further complicate negotiations on an EU-Mercosur association agreement. 
In addition, many European enterprises have been impaired by the bills for the nationalisation of 
the gas industry in Bolivia and also by the revision of contracts with transnational oil companies 
in Venezuela. In terms of political dialogue, the negative implications were felt at the last 
meeting between the EU and the Rio Group, in Santo Domingo in April 2007, which at the time 
was considered to have been a failure reflecting the growing tensions between both regions25. 
This kind of populism has also created even greater obstacles to the already weak South 
American integration process. At present it suffers from a dispute between opposite visions for 
regional integration. On the one hand, Venezuela defends the “Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Americas” based on its counter-hegemonic project, and on the other, Brazil presents an 
approach based on neofuncionalism, supporting the successive integration in different sectors, 
such as infrastructure, trade and investments. 
The EU takes note of the current political turmoil in South America with concern. In this sense, 
through the establishment of privileged relations with Brazil, the EU could help Brazil in 
exercising proactive leadership regionally, acting as a political counterweight to radical left-wing 
populism, in order to safeguard the interregional relations alongside the EU’s interests in South 
America. 
Over the last few years Brazil has also assumed a leading role on behalf of developing 
countries in the WTO through the G20 group, whose creation demonstrates how important the 
South-South alliances are to President Lula’s foreign policy. Another example of a coalition 
between emerging countries, in which Brazil participates, is the IBSA Dialogue Forum. This was 
created in 2003 and consists of a trilateral, developmental initiative between India, Brazil and 
South Africa to promote South-South cooperation and exchange. Since the establishment of the 
IBSA, its members have concluded numerous cooperation agreements and the volume of trade 
between them has tripled. 
The pursuit of a new interregional multilateralism in the South has strengthened Brazil’s position 
on the world stage. Within this context, the Mercosur integration project plays a prominent 
strategic role in Brazilian foreign policy. In that sense, the current government believes that the 
consolidation of Mercosur would strengthen Brazil’s diplomatic role in the international system. 
In the field of international security, Brazil has also intensified its presence, such as its active 
participation in UN peacekeeping missions26 and its bid for a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council27. With regards to regional security in South America, in recent years Brazil 
has placed the Amazon region at the core of its national defense policy. 
The security situation along the Colombian border described above has serious impact on 
citizen security in large Brazilian cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, where drug traffickers 
and organized crime have strong links to the FARC28. In order to tackle this problem of internal 
citizen security and its direct interaction with guerrilla activities, Brazil increased the deployment 
of military troops and equipment to the Amazon region and over the last years has sought to 
increase security cooperation with the Colombian government29. 
The actual Brazilian government, however, considers drug-related guerrilla activities to be 
Colombia’s internal security problem. This position reflects Brazil’s traditional foreign policy 
principle of non-intervention. In this spirit, the Brazilian government refuses to interfere with 
Colombian domestic affairs and has accordingly stated that it would only support Hugo 
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Chávez’s proposal for creating a group of friends of Colombia - among which a solution for the 
internal conflict could be negotiated - if such an initiative was directly requested by the 
Colombian government. 
Brazil has also been engaged in the development of a regional cooperative security policy. In 
this regard, the Brazilian government has proposed the creation of a South American Defense 
Council, which would mediate regional conflicts before they become regional crises. This 
initiative has the approval of several countries in the region and it is also supported by the 
United States, which perceives Brazil as a regional leader that better serves its interests than 
Venezuela30. 
However, some South American countries have expressed opposition to the Brazilian proposal. 
The Colombian government, for example, refuses to join the Council due to the resistance of 
some South American countries to define the FARC as a terrorist organization. Moreover, Chile 
is reluctant to accept the proposal. Although Chile supports the creation of such a Council, it 
stresses that its functions should be restricted to a consultation mechanism. For Chile the 
Council should not constitute a military alliance, due to its position against any kind of 
interference in national defence policy formulation.  
Furthermore, Brazil has an active role in the mediation process of regional crises31, prioritizing 
conflict resolution at the level of regional security institutions like the Organization of American 
States (OAS) and the Rio Group. 
Mercosur has a major political and strategic relevance in the promotion of stability in South 
America. In this sense, the commitment to regional integration is essential for an effective 
security policy in the region. It is true that the establishment of security agreements between 
countries of the region don’t depend on their membership to a certain regional integration 
scheme32. Nevertheless, a concerted response to regional security challenges emanated from 
Mercosur members would have a greater political meaning than individual or bilateral 
declarations and thus offer a more effective way to achieve respective policy objectives.  
In order to strengthen the Mercosur process, dialogue and cooperation with important partners 
in other parts of the world like the EU are indispensable. The current status of EU-Mercosur 
relations will be examined next. 
 
The status of EU-Mercosur relations 
Since its creation, Mercosur has enjoyed a special relationship with the EU. Mercosur is 
regarded as an emerging market and a significant regional integration project, with special 
appeal to the EU, which perceives it as a receptive region to which it can “export” its integration 
model. 
In November 1999 the two blocs began negotiations aiming to reach an association agreement 
by 2005 but progress has been slow due to disagreements mainly over import restrictions on 
agricultural goods. So far they have only reached the stage of discussing tariffs, the most 
sensitive part of any trade negotiation33. Moreover, negotiating as a bloc has often proved 
challenging for Mercosur given its divergent interests, as well as the weakness of its own 
internal agenda34. These realities have at times gotten in the way of negotiations with third 
parties. 
A new impulse was however given to the bi-regional relationship with the launch of the strategic 
partnership between Brazil and the EU. One of its central priorities is to revive trade talks 
between the EU and Mercosur in order to reach an interregional association agreement. 
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Moreover, Brazil and the EU assert their willingness to explore how to maximize cooperation 
and exchange of experiences on questions of regional integration. 
Nevertheless, this new bilateral route may ultimately be perceived as a substitute for the 
multilateral, bloc-to-bloc approach, which the EU has always favoured when negotiating with 
Latin America35. Given the persistent disagreements surrounding EU-Mercosur negotiations, 
the EU could decide through this new bilateral approach to strengthen its relations with Brazil, 
which might be affected by the current difficulties of the interregional negotiations. 
However the EU seeks, at the same time, within the framework of the bilateral strategic 
partnership with Brazil to reach an EU-Mercosur agreement. Under section 1 of the Commission 
Communication “Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership” it is written that “Brazil is central 
to the success of the EU-Mercosur negotiations, an EU priority strategic objective, which have 
not come to a conclusion due to lack of progress in the trade chapter thus preventing so far the 
establishment of a wider strategic association between the EU and Mercosur. Positive 
leadership of Brazil could move forward Mercosur negotiations.” 
This entails that the establishment of a special relationship between Brazil and the EU aims to 
revive trade talks between the EU and Mercosur. In this sense the bilateral strategic partnership 
is committed to the EU’s relations with Mercosur as well as the EU’s engagement with regional 
integration in South America36. This reflects the principles of the EU’s foreign policy, which is 
wholly committed to the promotion of regional integration processes in different parts of the 
world, through the establishment of multilateral agreements. 
Regarding security matters though, Mercosur and the EU have failed to make concrete 
proposals for greater cooperation. This lack of dialogue on security issues is generally 
explained by the fact that South America does not occupy a relevant place among EU’s security 
policy priorities. Geographically, it is not a neighbor region and neither does it represent any 
threats to European security. It is neither an area where weapons of mass destruction are 
produced and nor where any significant bases of international terrorism are located. As a result 
of this absence of threats in the region, security cooperation has never been high on the 
bilateral agenda between the EU and Mercosur. 
However, largely resulting from the current interdependent global security scenario, in recent 
years the EU and Mercosur have begun to share some security concerns, such as illegal 
immigration and drug trafficking. A permanent interregional dialogue would be a valuable 
instrument for both sides in tackling common security challenges. Brazil’s regional leadership 
plays a significant role in this context37. The following conclusion will point out the areas which 
have great potential to be further exploited, in order to boost bilateral security cooperation 
between the EU and Mercosur.  
  
Conclusions 
With the purpose of presenting recommendations for greater security cooperation between the 
EU and Mercosur, it is firstly necessary to identify possible common interests. Energy, social 
cohesion, migration, peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and crisis management are 
the most prominent domains for interregional cooperation. 
Cooperation in some areas of common interest here identified - like social cohesion and the 
fight against drug trafficking -  has been discussed for years under the framework of EU-Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ALC) political dialogue. Thus, the recommendations now 
presented are also valid for closer security cooperation between the EU and ALC, since the EU-
Mercosur dialogue is entirely connected to the broader EU-ALC relations. 
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Security is increasingly becoming a complex issue linked to heterogeneous areas like energy. 
Although the EU and Mercosur have different perspectives on energy security – for Europe the 
issue is linked to reliable and safe access to energy suppliers, whereas for South American 
countries it has to do also with the control of the exploitation of natural resources - both regions 
face the common challenge of developing a sustainable energy network. 
In this respect, the EU and Mercosur are large importers of natural gas. Energy cooperation is 
therefore an area full of prospects for both sides. Brazil occupies a prominent position in the 
production, distribution and consumption of biofuels. The exploitation of renewable energy 
sources is particularly important in South America, given the current regional shortage of natural 
gas38. 
Similarly, the EU has a major interest in the use of alternative energy resources. The bloc has 
become too dependent on foreign conventional sources of energy, much of which comes from 
unstable regions39. Moreover, the increasing scarcity of fossil fuels and their negative 
environmental impact has given rise to a political willingness to seek greater development of 
renewable resources40. Therefore cooperation with Brazil in searching for new energy supplies 
and in developing new technologies would allow for a reduction in the EU’s dependence on 
foreign energy imports, particularly oil and gas, and at the same time contribute to reaching its 
energy-related environmental policy goals. The launch of the EC-Brazil Energy Policy Dialogue 
in 2007 could provide a good basis for promoting policies on energy security, efficiency and 
sustainability41. 
The central threats to South American security presented earlier have a direct connection with 
two major common problems faced by every country in the region: poverty and institutional 
weakness. Drug-related guerrilla activity in Colombia and terrorist activity in the Triple Border 
benefit from the general levels of poverty in South America. 
Within this context, closer cooperation with the EU in promoting social cohesion is very 
welcome. Although social cohesion matters are perceived in different ways by Mercosur and the 
EU, both regions recognize the eradication of poverty as one of the greatest global challenges. 
In tune with that the fight against poverty, inequality and exclusion was one of the main themes 
of the fifth EU – ALC Summit held in Lima, Peru on 16-17 May 2008. In the Joint Declaration the 
Heads of State and Government of Latin America and the Caribbean and the EU reiterated their 
commitment to policies for the eradication of hunger and the fight against poverty. Furthermore, 
they agreed on immediate measures to assist the most vulnerable countries and populations 
affected by high food prices. 
Moreover, Brazil’s important role in promoting stability in Latin America as well as its active 
engagement in South American integration can contribute to deep EU-Mercosur cooperation in 
the field of social protection, inclusion policies and reduction of regional divides. Brazil has a 
central role to play in providing socio-economic stability within Mercosur, in particular in 
Paraguay, where destabilizing factors like corruption and drug and arms trafficking are largely 
used to the benefit of international organized crime groups. In this respect, a recent response to 
the problem of asymmetry between Mercosur member states, even though limited, was the 
establishment of the Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEN), a fund of US$100 
million, of which Brazil is the principal financier. The fund’s objective is to aid the development 
of the lesser economies in the bloc (Paraguay and Uruguay). 
Migration is another area on which Mercosur and EU security interests converge. Although it is 
a very sensitive subject in Europe, the demographic issue will pressure political authorities to 
act. Immigrant populations with their bottom-heavy age pyramids can help support Europe’s 
aging populations and assure its international competitiveness in increasingly disputed markets. 
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Furthermore, both sides are committed to fighting illegal immigration. A serious issue connected 
to this is the international trafficking of women for sexual exploitation. On this matter 
agreements between the EU and Mercosur should be concluded, in order to prevent 
clandestine immigration and the exploitation of irregular immigrants42. 
Enhanced cooperation measures should also be developed in the fight against drug trafficking, 
cross-border crimes and international terrorism because these subjects represent real threats to 
regional security not only in Latin America but also in Europe.   
Regarding peacekeeping operations, Brazil’s prominent role in the UN Stabilization Mission in 
Haiti (MINUSTAH)43 has encouraged the EU to seek to coordinate its efforts with Mercosur not 
only in Haiti but also in peace and stabilization operations in general44. For its part, Mercosur 
should call for the EU’s commitment to regional issues that affect their relationship, like conflict 
prevention and civil crisis management. This field, in which the EU has much experience, offers 
manifold possibilities of cooperation, for instance, in conflict resolution in South America. In 
concrete terms, Mercosur member states could be responsible for conducting the mediation, 
due to their geographical proximity and their cultural affinity with the countries of the region, 
while the EU could contribute by financing social and economic development projects in the 
conflict area. 
Finally, the dialogue and information exchange undertaken in the framework of cooperation 
between the respective regional security organizations, namely the Organization of American 
States (OAS) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are 
extremely important in dealing with the common menaces facing the EU and Mercosur. 
Although there are delicate divergences in security perspectives and interests among members 
of these two organizations, the OAS/OSCE cooperation could be developed into a valuable 
mechanism, by including, for example, the drafting of concerted positions on shared security 
concerns, such as drug trafficking, organized crime and international terrorism and the creation 
of a permanent forum, where important issues about regional security would be discussed and 
common missions would be coordinated and planned. 
For all this, security cooperation is an area full of prospects for the EU and Mercosur. In recent 
years the assertiveness and activism pursued by Lula’s foreign policy has been a decisive 
element in placing Brazil on the global stage. On defense and security matters, Brazil plays a 
growing role in South America. The EU should therefore place the country on a high-priority 
diplomatic footing, in order to enhance its relations with Mercosur. The launch of the bilateral 
strategic partnership was certainly a first step but it must prove to be more than a mere 
recognition of Brazil’s position and move the interregional relations forward. 
In this respect, the EU and Mercosur should take each other seriously as global partners. 
Through its political influence within Mercosur and also through its privileged position now as 
EU’s strategic partner, Brazil should advocate closer cooperation between the EU and Mercosur 
in tackling common security challenges. This would be a real contribution not only to the 
promotion of effective multilateralism and stability in the international security system but also to 
regional security in South America. 
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